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ARE WE FAMILY?: LESBIAN RIGHTS
AND WOMEN'S LIBERATION©
By DIDI HERMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, library worker Karen Andrews began her struggle
for family coverage under the Ontario Health Insurance Plan
(OHIP). She wished to have herself, her partner, and the children
they co-parented deemed a "family" for the purposes of health
benefit legislation; doing so would reduce the premiums they were
each liable to pay. Since then, her efforts have resulted in a report
from the Ontario Ombudsman's Office recommending OHIP
coverage for lesbian and gay couples,1 a Supreme Court of Ontario
decision rejecting the recommendation, 2 and the development of a
supporting campaign within the lesbian and gay communities using
the theme We Are Family. The case is currently under appeal.
Karen Andrews' struggle is part of a broader lesbian and gay
rights movement that has arisen in western capitalist countries within
0
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1 Ontario. Report of the Ombudsman's Opiniorn Reasons Therefore, and Recommendation
FollowingHis Investigation Into the Complaint of Ms. Karen Andrews (20 February 1987, File

No. 47699).
2

Andrews v. Ontario (MinisterofHealth), [1988] 9 C.H.R.R. D1/5089, 49 D.L.R. (4th) 584,

C.L.L.C. 16191, (Ont. H.C.) [hereinafter Karen Andrews cited to C.L.L.C.].
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the last two decades. Lesbians and gay men have come to rely on
legal mechanisms as an offensive strategy aimed at securing their
rights as homosexuals. Much of the resulting discourse has centred
on notions of what constitutes "family," including definitions and
potential meanings of words like "spouse!' and "marriage." I believe
it is necessary to step back and reflect critically upon this strategy,
particularly for those of us who, as socialists and feminists, tend to
evaluate reform initiatives in terms of their revolutionary potential
(that is, for the liberation of peoples of colour, women, and the
working class). 3
The politics of lesbian and gay rights raises certain questions.
For example, have we moved from a discourse of liberation to one
of rights, and if so, what are the implications? Are our movements
in danger of being depoliticized or of losing their radical potential?
What happens when lesbians attempt to appropriate familial
ideology? Are lesbian families inherently radical? Can there be
such a thing as a lesbian family? When we call ourselves families
or spouses, and perhaps win this recognition from legal institutions,
are the meanings of these words radicalized or are we simply
accommodating ourselves to existing structures and ideologies
without subverting them? Does the ability of state structures to
accommodate us, in turn, simply reinforce their power in our lives?
How do our legal arguments fit in with feminist theories of the
social construction of gender and sexuality? Do popular notions of
immutability, and their reflection in the form of legal argumentation,
remove the possibilities of liberating choice for women, denying us
roles as active agents concerning our own sexuality? This paper will
use the Karen Andrews litigation as a starting point to examine the
3 Elizabeth Schneider asks a series of questions I have found useful to focus this issue:
"Does the use of legal struggle generally and rights discourse in particular help build a social
movement? Does articulating a right advance political organizing and assist in political
education? Can a right be articulated in a way that is consistent with the politics of an issue
or that helps redefine it? Does the transformation of political insight into legal argumentation
capture the political visions that underlie the movement? Does the use of rights keep us in
touch with or divert us from consideration of and struggle around the hard questions of
political choice and strategy? Does it keep the movement passive or help it begin to act?
Does it help the movement to determine what it really wants? Does it limit or constrain the
movement's vision of what might be possible?" See E. Schneider, 'The Dialectic of Rights and
Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement" (1986) 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589 at
622-23.
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increasing use of law by lesbians and gay men. In the process,
although the above questions will be far from resolved, the
discussion may encourage further analysis and reflection.
I.

THE POLITICS OF FAMILY

Karen Andrews initially began her struggle for family OHIP
coverage by attempting to use the grievance procedure contained in
her collective agreement. She argued that her employer's refusal
to extend the health benefit amounted to sexual orientation4
discrimination, which was specifically prohibited in the agreement.
It took one and a half years for the parties to settle on an
arbitration panel. Subsequently, the grievance became even more
bogged down in bureaucratic and legalistic red-tape.s Andrews
eventually filed a complaint with the Office of the Ontario
6
Ombudsman who quickly released a report supporting her claim.
The government refused to implement the Ombudsman's
and Andrews chose to commence the current
recommendations,
7
litigation.
Andrews asked the Ontario Supreme Court to overturn the
government's "heterosexuals only" interpretation of "spouse" under
the Health InsuranceAct regulations (by this point, the employer had
acceded to Andrews' request, and the only obstacle that stood in the
way was the Ministry of Health's refusal to authorize extension of
the benefits).8 The regulations themselves did not define the term
"spouse." However, the Ministry insisted that only heterosexual
couples were included. Andrews' application requested, among other
4 K. Andrews, Address (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 22 February 1989)

[unpublished].
5

bkid

6 Report of die Ombudsman's Opinion, supra, note 1.
7 Andrews chose to apply directly to the Ontario Supreme Court rather than to the
Ontario Human Rights Commission, since she was advised that the matter was one of legal

interpretation and would ultimately end up in the courts on appeal anyway; see supra, note
4.
8 Health InsuranceAct, R.S.O. 1980, c.197, R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 452, ss.1 & 37(1)(i).
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things, a declaration that the exclusion of lesbian and gay partners
from the term "spouse" was contrary to sections 1 and 4 of the
Human Rights Code and to sections 2, 7, and 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9
Justice McCrae of the Ontario Supreme Court declined to
make such a declaration. McCrae J. found that the term spouse did
not include homosexual partners. In his reasons for judgment, he
cited numerous Ontario statutes and various dictionaries, all of which
defined spouse as a person of the opposite sex.10 Following Blainey
v. Ont. Hockey Association,11 he refused to take jurisdiction on the
Human Rights Code claim, stating that such matters were to go the
Human Rights Commission at first instance. With respect to section
15 of the Charter,McCrae J. applied the pre-Andrews v. Law Society
"similarly situated" test.12 According to McCrae J., lesbians and gay
13
men fail this test because of their inability to marry and procreate.
Further, he found that the exclusion of homosexual couples was not
discriminatory since such couples were treated no differently than
any other "combination" of single persons living together.' 4 Finally,
under section 1, the government's interpretation of spouse was

9 Karen Andrews, supra, note 2; Applicant's Factum to the Supreme Court of Ontario,

at 2-3. Human Rights Code, 1981, S.O. 1981, c.53, s.1: "Every person has a right to equal
treatment with respect to services, goods and facilities, without discrimination because of ...
sexual orientation ..." Section 4 states: "Every person has a right to equal treatment with
respect to employment without discrimination because of ...
sexual orientation ..." Canadian
Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the ConstitutionAc, 1982, being Schedule B of the

Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 [hereinafter Charter]. Section 15(1) will be the only
provision discussed in this paper- "Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in

particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex,
age or mental or physical disability."
10

Karen Andrews, supra, note 2 at 16192-93.

11 Blainey v. OnL Hockey Assoc. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.).
12 The Supreme Court of Canada in Andrews v. Law Society (B.C.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143,
[1989] 2 W.W.R. 289 [hereinafter Law Society] has rendered a strict "similarly situated" test

obsolete. This test gave equal application of section 15 to those groups deemed to share a like
position before the law in question. See text, infra at 810-814.
Karen Andrews, supra, note 2 at 16193.
14 Ibid. at 16194.
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viewed as being "economically practical" and related to the important
15
objective of "establishing and maintaining traditional families.u
The decision in Karen Andrews was generally consistent with
the law in this area (the recent case of Mossop v. Dept. of Sec. State
(Can.), which adopts a very different analysis, will be discussed
further below).1 6 In Vogel v. Manitoba, a Manitoba human rights
board of adjudication looked to dictionary definitions of spouse to
deny a gay partner workplace dental plan coverage.1 7 In a similar,
more recent Ontario labour arbitration case, the Board used the
"opposite sex" definition of spouse in section 9(1)0) of the Human
Rights Code to bypass the Code's sexual orientation discrimination
prohibition under sections 1 and 4.18 In another case, a Quebec
labour arbitration board refused to find that a lesbian partner was
"immediate family" for the purposes of a special leave provision in
the collective agreement.19 The employee's partner could not be
"common-law spouse" since the women were unable to
considered a 20
legally marry.
In 1989, a very different conclusion was reached by a

Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Mossop.21 Here, adjudicator
M.E. Atcheson held that a collective agreement provision was in
breach of the Canadian Human Rights Act for denying to lesbians

and gay men a bereavement leave benefit for deaths in a partner's

15 Ibid
16 Mossop v.Dept. of Sec. State (Can.), [1989] C.L.L.C. 16041 (C.H.R.T.) [hereinafter
Mossop].
17 Vogel v. Manitoba (1983), 4 C.H.R.R. D/1654 (Man. Bd. Adj.) [hereinafter Vogel].
18 Re Carleton University and CUPE (1988), 35 L.A.C. (3d) 96 (Ont. Arb. Bd.)

[hereinafter Re Carlton]. Section 9(1)0) of the Code reads: "'spouse' means the person to
whom a person of the opposite sex is married or with whom the person is living in a conjugal

relationship outside marriage."
19 C.U.P.E. v. Canada Post (27 March 1986), Montreal 86-4-C-11 (Can. Arb. Bd.).
20 Ibid. at 9. with regard to support obligations, see also Anderson v. Luoma (1984),

[1985] 42 R.F.L. (2d) 444 (B.C.S.C.), 50 R.F.L. (2d) 127 (B.C.S.C.).
21 Mossop, supra, note 16.
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family.22 The Act's definition of "family" was interpreted to include
lesbian and gay relationships. The Tribunal expressly rejected relying
on "general understandings" or "historical roots," arguipg that "terms
... must be tested in today's world, against an understanding of how
people are living and how language reflects reality."23 The result in
this case is a marked departure from the law in this area.24
Mossop may signal an increased willingness of lawmakers to
take account of the reality of lesbian and gay existence, but this
case remains, for now, an anomaly. For the most part, definitions
of spouse and family continue to be based on the ability to marry
and procreate. This reflects an absurd Catch-22 situation for
lesbians and gay men who are denied the ability to marry since our
relationships cannot be considered spousal. A lesbian or gay
marriage cannot, by definition, qualify as marriage at all.25 Biology
and dictionaries combine to assert only one possible meaning to
these concepts. 2 6 Are judges and other decision-makers wrong to
find that the institutions of family and marriage necessarily exclude
lesbians and gay men? Are the results in these cases bad law?
Virtually all family/spousal lesbian and gay litigation till now
has proceeded from a "sameness" model of analysis. The lesbian or
gay claimant attempts to demonstrate that their intimate relationship
is qualitatively no different from that of the paradigmatic
heterosexual couple. For example, Karen Andrews argued that she
and her partner

22 CanadianHuman Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, ss. 7(b) & 10(b) [hereinafter Act].

The discrimination alleged was based on the 'family status' ground in the Act.
23

Mossop, supra, note 16 at 16057.

24 After this article was completed, Mossop was overturned by the Federal Court of
Appeal (29 June 1990, court file A-199-89).
25 See North v. Matheson, [1976] 20 R.F.L. 112 (Man. Co. Ct.); Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W. 2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9 Cir. 1982); Singer v. Hara,
Wash. App., 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. C.A. 1974); Baker v. Nelson 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W. 2d
185 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
26 Similar decisions have been reached at the European Court of Human Rights. See
for example, Rees v. UK (1987), 9 E.H.R.R. 56 at 61 and App. No. 9369/81 v. UK (1983),
5 E.H.R.R. 581. For a discussion of the right to privacy under international human rights law,
see P. Girard, 'The Protection of the Rights of Homosexuals Under the International Law
of Human Rights: European Perspectives" (1986) Can. Hum. Rts Y.B. 3.
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regard themselves and hold themselves out to the community as each other's spouse
and intend to continue to live together as each other's spouse. Andrews and
TrenhoIm are each other's sole domestic and sexual partners, own their home as
account and have named each other
joint tenants, have their assets in
2 7 a joint bank
as beneficiary under their wills.

The gay grievor in Re Carleton stated that he and his partner
are each other's sole domestic and sexual partners; spend their holidays and
vacations together, share the common necessities of life; share all household
[they] hold themselves out
reponsibilities; and are economically interdependent ...
to the communy as each other's spouse and intend to continue to live as each
other's spouse.21

The description of these relationships resembles remarkably that of
the traditional family form (or at least its ideal).2 9 Up to this point,
however, few decision-makers have accepted the analogy. What are
the implications of lesbians and gay men employing familial ideology
to found rights claims? What might it mean if such arguments come
to be accepted in legal forums?
A number of feminist theorists have identified the capitalist
family formation as a primary site of women's economic and
ideological oppression. Michele Barrett and Mary McIntosh have
written that this family is a "vigorous agency of class placement and
an efficient mechanism for the creation and transmission of gender
[it is] the focal point of a set of ideologies that resonate
inequality ...

27 See Applicant's Factum, supra, note 9 at 3. Karen Andrews' factum does not use the
word "lesbian" at any time. This was a strategic decision made by Andrews' lawyers.
Address, supra, note 4.

See

28 Re Carleton, supra, note 18 at 98. See also S. Gnutel, "Not A Real Family, YMCA
Rejects Lesbian Couple's Request For Family Status" Xtra (17 March 1989) 5: "they have
own a business and a house together, and function in all ways
been partners for four years ...
as a social and economic unit."
29 See Margrit Eichler's discussion of the definition of "family' in Families in Canada
Today: Recent Changes and Their Policy Consequences (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1983) at
3-9. Eichler submitted an affidavit in support of Karen Andrews in which she concluded
that "Karen Andrews and Mary Trenholm, and her [sic] children, should be regarded as a
familial unit. The only basis for distinguishing Karen Andrews and Mary Trenholm from
cohabitating heterosexual couples who receive dependent coverage, is the fact that they are
sexual orientation per se is not a useful basis for determining eligibility for
of the same sex ...
social benefits ... " Karen Andrews, supra, note 2, Affidavit of Dr. Margrit Eichler at 4 (see
court file no. 170-88).
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throughout society."30 They argue that the major significance of the
family in capitalist societies today is ideological, and that its material
basis has been largely undermined by developing economic
conditions3
Thus, the material reality of how people live is in
contradiction with the ideology. At the same time, familial ideology
itself devalues the lives of those who do not fit its ideal.3 2
Carol Smart argues that the family constitutes "one instance
of the operation of patriarchal relations in the concrete."3 3 The
family as an institution is structured upon male domination of
women in the sexual, reproductive, and labour spheres. Marriage,
then, is a "tie that binds," the "cornerstone and the mechanics of the
reproduction of family across generations." 34 With respect to the
relationship between family and law, Smart suggests that
law is a valid area for critique and reform because law both celebrates and sustains
a particular family form, it privileges marriages above all other relationships
(including parenthood) and it consequently constitutes a major obstacle to any
35
fundamental change to the organization of our domestic lives.

Similarly, Shelley Gavigan argues that law defines and re-enforces
the meaning of family as ideology; she suggests that this may be a
more important area of inquiry than studying the unequal treatment
of women under family law.3 6

These theorists contend that hegemonic familial ideology is a
primary contributor to the oppression and exploitation of women.
They argue that there is little point in constructing oppositional
familial ideologies because the family form is itself inextricably tied
to class and gender relations of power. For Barrett and McIntosh,
30 M. Barrett & M. McIntosh, TheAnti-Social Family (London: Verso Editions, 1982)
at 29.
31 Ibid at 33-34.
32 Ibid at 77-80.
33 C. Smart, The Ties That Bin&k Law, Marriage and the Reproduction of Patriarchal
Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) at 10-11.
34 Ibid at 144-45.
35

Ibid at 221.
36 S.A.M. Gavigan, "Law, Gender and Ideology" in A.F. Bayefsky, ed., Legal Theory Meets
Legal Practice (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988) 283 at 293-94.
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a central feature of the feminist project is, thus, to ensure that the
needs met practically and ideologically by this institution be met
socially in an unprivatized form.37 Smart explicitly argues againstlesbians and gay men seeking admission to dominant definitions of
family relations:
A primary goal must be to jettison the privileged status of the heterosexual married

couple, but not in order to create a different hierarchy of unmarried households.
The aim is not to extend the legal and social definition of marriage to cover

cohabitees or even homosexual couples, it is to abandon the status of marriage
are not
altogether and to devise a system of rights, duties, or obligations which
38
dependent on any form of coupledom or marriage or quasi-marage.

Given this analysis, the courts have been right, thus far in their
assessment of lesbian and gay rights claims. Our relationships simply
cannot be family, because family necessitates the productive,
reproductive, and sexual exploitation of women by men. Our
ceremonies of commitment cannot be marriages because marriage
is the legal tie binding women to family. And the word "spouse"
cannot include us because its meaning must be derived from the
legal relationship that has historically defined women's subordination
within family, which is marriage. In this sense, judges know with
subjective intuition what feminist theorists explain with objective
analysis. By appropriating familial ideology, lesbians and gay men
may be supporting the very institutional structures that create and
perpetuate women's oppression. Our reliance on the language of
monogamy, cohabitation, life-long commitment, and other essentials
of bona fide heterosexual coupledom may divide us, not only from
other lesbians and gays who do not live in this fashion, but from all
people defined as "single" by virtue of their exclusion from the
model.
This case was painfully illustrated in the Karen Andrews
litigation when sociologist Margrit Eichler was cross-examined by the
government's lawyer. In her supporting affidavit, Eichler had
concluded that Andrews and Trenholme's relationship satisfied a
"dimensional" definition of family. 39 The cross-examination was
37 Barrett & McIntosh, supra, note 30 at 134, 155-59.
38 Smart, supra, note 33 at 146.
39 See Karen Andrews, supra, note 2, affidavit of Dr. Margrit Eichler.
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intended to suggest that her definition was overly broad. 40 Simply,
the government attempted to throw up the red "floodgates" flag. A

series of hypothetical living situations were put to Eichler and she
was pushed to agree that they all might qualify as families under her
approach. Andrews' lawyer felt he had to undo this damage and
conducted a re-direct examination. The following exchange took
place:
Q: Mr. Charney asked you numbers [sic] of questions with respect to various
arrangements - I'll call it arrangements - and I had understood you to say that the
facts would have to be - some subjective facts may have to be considered. The
example that he put to you of a sister/sister relationship, living together, would you
view that as a spousal-like relationship for the purposes of OHIP coverage?

A. No, because there is a possibility of a sexual relationship absent altogether, and
"Spouse" implies that there is the - there may not in fact be a sexual relationship,
because we know that in certain couples there isn't, but there is the possibility, and
it's assumed that that is one of the activities that a couple engages in.
Q: He also gave you the example of a heterosexual couple who are living together
in the absence of any sexual relationship, and I understood what you said with the
question of permanent - or the intention of permanence - but would you view that
as a spousal-like relationship?

A: If there's no intention ever to have a sexual relationship -

Q: I think that was his premise.

A- - no. I would not define it as a couple, because that is part of the definition,
the possibility of a sexual relationship ...
you would not use the term "Couple" if
there is no possibility or assumption that this would ever transpire.

Q: Just to.be clear, you've used the term "Couple," and Mr. Charney has used the
term "Family," and I'm going to use the term "Spousal-like relationship."

A. Spousal-like?

Q: Yes.

4 bid. See transcript of cross-examination of Dr. Margrit Eichler at 3-23.
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A:
Spousal-like would be a fine description in terms of a homosexual or
heterosexual couple.

Q: And in terms of this heterosexual couple who are living together, and there is
no intention of sexual relationship; would they fit within the definition of a "Spousal
relationship," within the context of OHIP, that we've been discussing?
41

A: No.

What are we to make of this? Surely it is extremely
problematic for feminists and socialists to support a lesbian rights
struggle which argues that the essence of family, and therefore of
entitlement to state benefits, is the "possibility" of a sexual
relationship between the members. At a practical level, many people
would be disentitled simply because they do not engage in sexual
activity with other members of their households. At a theoretical
level, how do we determine what is "possible"? How do we define
what constitutes a "sexual relationship"? And by reference to what
norms do we decide that there is no "possibility" of a "sexual
relationship" between two heterosexually-identified women or men
living together? It would seem that this type of argument reinforces
rather than subverts the traditional form of family and a family status
basis of entitlement to benefits. By claiming our rights as spouses,
rather than our rights/needs as people, we emulate and legitimize the
ideological norm and we also compound the marginalization of
others.
There have, however, been a number of critical responses to
this feminist critique of family. In recent years, some of the
assumptions underlying this analysis have come under increasing
attack. Much of the criticism has been initiated by feminists writing
out of their experience as women of colour. These theorists argue
that a general anti-family politic is implicitly racist and such discourse
cannot take account of how family can be a source of strength,
affirmation, and resistance for people who experience racial
oppression.
Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis, for example, have
suggested that white, western feminists' generalizations about family
41 Ibid at 24-25
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are accultural and that "family may not be the or even a major site
of women's oppression when families are kept apart by occupying or
colonizing forces."42 Hazel Carby argues that in capitalist societies,
"the Black family has been a site of political and cultural resistance
to racism," and that ideologies of Black womanhood have been
43
constructed primarily through labour and not family relations.
Others contend that, far from overthrowing the family, what is
needed is a movement to save the non-white family from obliteration
resulting44 from the implementation of neo-conservative economic
policies.
When these writers use the term "family," they mean
something quite different from the ideological construct critiqued by
Barrett and McIntosh, Smart, and Gavigan. Harriet Michel suggests
that
[b]ecause slavery often denied us the right to live with our biological kin, our
definition of family became any group of individuals who collectively come together
in order
to provide economic and emotional support to the members of the
45
groups.

Jewelle Gomez has specifically taken issue with lesbian and gay
anti-family discourse:
the Civil Rights movement was a family movement. For most Afro-Americans the
idea of separating from family is appalling and possibly fatal. The family (not the
nuclear thing "they" talk about, but our family as we construct it) is our survival
mechanism, and few of us would be willing to relinquish
it. It is impossible for us
46
to imagine moving forward without our families.

42 F. Anthias & N. Yuval-Davis, "Contextualizing Feminism - Gender, Ethnic and Class
Divisions" (1983) 15 Feminist Rev. 62 at 72. See also, "Constitutional Guidelines for a
Democratic South Africa," Article (V) (the family), (Lusaka: African National Congress).
43 H. Carby, "White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood"
in The Empire Strikes Back Race and Racism in 70s Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1982) at
214-15.

44 H.R. Michel, 'The Case for the Black Family" (1987) 4 Harv. Blackletter 3. 21 at 24:
"All persons of good conscience should actively advocate those policies that will strengthen
families ... "
45

1bid at 21.

46 j. Gomez, "Repeat After Me: We Are Different, We Are the Same" (1986) 14 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 935 at 939.
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For our purposes, it might be useful to ask whether there are
parallels here to notions of a radical lesbian or gay family. If there
is validity to the claim that the "Black family" is a site of resistance
and affirmation, perhaps this idea can be imported into this
discussion (the non-white family and the lesbian/gay family are, of
course, not mutually exclusive categories).
A number of lesbian and gay writers have explicitly argued
that lesbian and gay families are qualitatively different from
heterosexual families and, as such, are inherently subversive.
Richard Goldstein has put it this way:
The gay family is short-hand for a new institution; one that bears little resemblance

to the patriarchal structure most of us were raised in.

Homosexuals are, by

definition, outside that structure, and given our status, when we try to47appropriate

the tradition of forming families, we end up creating something new.

Baba Copper invokes the concept of "lesbian mothering" to suggest
that lesbian motherhood "embodies a remarkable chance to redesign
woman's primary biologically-based role in the service of
woman-chosen goals."48 At the 1987 March on Washington for
Lesbian and Gay Rights, one of the featured actions was a mass
wedding ceremony to celebrate "the relationships of hundreds and
perhaps thousands of same-sex couples."49 One lesbian rights lawyer
50
described this scene as "incredibly subversive."
Lesbian and gay communities do not, however, present a
monolithic opinion on this issue. Nancy Polikoff argues that there
is nothing inherently radical about lesbian/gay families and that the
question of whether our households pose a challenge to heterosexual
institutions is rooted in how we live our lives
She suggests that
R. Goldstein, '"he Gay Family, Motherhood, Fatherhood, and Selfhood, The Bond

That Ties" Village Voice (1 July 1986) 19 at 24.
48 B. Copper, 'The Radical Potential in Lesbian Mothering of Daughters" in S. Pollack
and J. Vaughn, eds, Politics of the Heart: A Lesbian ParentingAntholo
Books, 1987) 233 at 240.

(Ithaca:

Firebrand

49 March on Washington ForLesbian And Gay Rights, October 11, 1987 (leaflet).

50 Conversation with Roberta Achtenberg, lawyer with the Lesbian Rights Project, San
Francisco (18 February 1989).
51 N. Polikoff, "Lesbians Choosing Children:

Politics of the Heart,supra, note 48 at 48.

The Personal is Political Revisited" in
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lesbian mothers who do not publicly identify themselves as lesbians
"assume a public position of heterosexuality, ' 2 and that there is
nothing fundamentally radical about this:
Motherhood is an institution. It functions as an integral part of patriarchal society
to maintain and promote patriarchy. Our lesbianism does not negate or transform
the institution of motherhood. Motherhood, like marriage, is too loaded with this
patriarchal history and
function to be an entirely different phenomenon just because
53
lesbians are doing it.

But this approach may be overly functionalist. Families are sites of
contradiction; the very word means different things to different
people. And there would seem to be more than one familial
ideology. Perhaps lesbian families hold a different kind of potential
than do gay male ones.
On the other hand, we can insist, like Barrett and McIntosh,
that what we need is a new society, not new forms of family.54 The
material and emotional needs met today by family and familial
ideology should be met socially and be unprivatized. However, the
current economic and political climate does not give one much hope
that the state will assume the provision of such needs. Indeed, the
1980's witnessed the retreat of many western states from principles
of welfare capitalism. Thus, one could respond to Barrett and
McIntosh's "come the revolution approach" with a great deal of
skepticism. 55 But do we then, like lesbian rights lawyer Roberta
52 Ibid. at 53.
53 Ibid at 54.
54 Barrett & McIntosh, supra, note 30 at 158-59: "What is needed is not to build up an
alternative to the family - new forms of household that would fulfil all the needs that families
are supposed to fulfil today - but to make the family less necessary, by building up all sorts
of other ways of meeting people's needs, ways less volatile and inadequate than those based
on the assumption that 'blood is thicker than water'." Barrett and McIntosh offer suggestions,
such as the following, in order to make the family "less necessary": higher wages, better
welfare, family law reform, and avoidance of marriage. See at 140.43, 155. Carol Smart urges
withdrawing privileges currently given to married heterosexuals, abolishing illegitimacy, and
extending state benefits on the basis of need or contribution not 'family status'. Smart, supra,
note 33 at 145-46.
55 The kind of society Barrett and McIntosh envision seems pretty far down the road.
Also, there is little evidence that women (much less lesbians and gay men) are much better
off as women under existing socialist systems or that 'family' is any less of a fundamental
institution despite the implementation of some of the reforms advocated by these theorists.
See, generally, Barrett & McIntosh, supra, note 30.
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Achtenberg, contend that subversion lies in the expansion of
meaning accorded to terms like family and marriage?
To force systems like the legal system to accommodate, to change, to capitulate, to
recognize the existence of rights for any despised group is to reshape the
perceptions of who that group is and how much their existence is valued or their
plight is of concern to the collective conscience. Changing the law to make it fit
and serve the lives as actually lived of lesbians and gay males is a symbolically
significant way of
resisting the derogatory characterizations now fostered by the
56

existing symbols.

Achtenberg seems to be arguing that law reform is part of an
ideological battle, and that fighting over the meanings of marriage
and family constitutes resistance to heterosexual hegemony. Can
her approach be reconciled with Smart's call to feminists to resist
marriage as "an important feminist strategy" and her explicit
condemnation of tactics aimed at extending "the legal and social
definition of marriage to cover cohabitees or even homosexual
couples"?5 7 Do the positions of Achtenberg and Smart reveal
deep-seated theoretical differences or are they reflective of the
different priorities of lawyers and academics?
One could conclude that the response to the experience of
oppression cannot lie in a retreat into family, whatever the form,
and certainly not into the discourse of familial ideology. Our
families may be different in that they are not premised on the
subordination of women by men. Yet, even if we assume that
lesbian or gay families are so different or radical (and these are by
no means the same thing), the ability of existing structures to
accommodate us is done at the expense of women as a whole. We
gain entry into the institutions, and (if we win our cases) thereby
further entrench these institutions in law. Does this expand overall
choice for women? We must also reconcile ourselves with the
reality that for some, families and oppositional familial ideologies

56 R. Achtenberg, A Brief Essay on the Impact of Law On Ideology As It Relates to
Lesbians and Gay Men in the United States [unpublished] at 3.
57 Smart, supra; note 33 at 146. Carol Smart now argues the need for feminists to
engage with law as discourse, to expose law's pretentions to truth and thus to undermine its
power (as opposed to contributing to its discursive hegemony through law reform strategies).
See C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989). This is an
approach I am pursuing further in doctoral research.

804

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOi. 28, No. 4

"Resisting
are important sites of resistance and affirmation.
marriage" may not necessarily be a radical strategy for all women.
Perhaps I have not even begun to address the more significant
questions. How, for example, do we determine what ideologies and
What is the
practices are radical rather than reactionary?
relationship between intent and effects? And how do we assess the
impact of contradictory effects at the end of the day? A somewhat
related debate is currently being played out in legal "rights debate"
discourse. It may be useful to temporarily shift gears and look at
lesbian and gay rights claims in this broader context.
III. THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS
In recent years, the efficacy of rights-based litigation has been
the subject of heated debate. American academics associated with
the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) school have developed a "critique
of rights."58 Canadian socialists have also pronounced negatively on
rights claims in the context of Charter litigation 5 9 The essence of
the CLS critique is that rights claims perpetuate the dichotomy
between individual and community. 60 Rights discourse seizes on
what separates the individual from the group and thereby inhibits
the development of social movements. Such discourse further
promotes a kind of false consciousness, a belief that rights are

58 See, generally, P. Gabel, 'The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact
of the Withdrawn Selves"

(1984) 62 Tex. L. Rev. 1563; P. Gabel & P. Harris, "Building

Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law" (1982-1983) 11
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369; D. Kennedy, 'The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries" (1979) 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 209; M. Tushnet, "An Essay on Rights" (1984) 62
Tex. L Rev. 1363.
59 For example, M. Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in
Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989) [hereinafter Legalization ofPolitlics]; M. Mandel,
"Marxism and the Rule of Law" (1986) 35 U.N.B.L.J. 7; HJ.Glasbeek & M. Mandel, "The

Legalization of Politics in Advanced Capitalism:

The Canadian Charter of Rights and

Freedoms" (1984) 2 Socialist Studies/Etudes Socialistes 84; J. Fudge, 'The Public/Private

Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further
Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ.485.

60 Supra, note 58.
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ends-in-themselves.61 Rights not only become reified, but people
become dependent on the state (including the courts) to grant them
rights that are essentially formal and unsubstantive.
In the Canadian context, Marxist writers have argued that the
62
enactment of the Charter has accomplished a similar result.
Glasbeek and Mandel, for example, suggest that the form of many
Charter rights is abstract, liberal, subject to enormous variation in
interpretation, and essentially without content. This has contributed
to an overall legalization of political discourse. Abstract rights
discourse turns conflicts of interests into conflicts of rights: "the
legal technique actually obscures [political] issues by dealing with
them in abstractions that are meant to disguise the political nature
of the choices being made."63 Seeking unsubstantive equality
obfuscates an understanding of actual social relations. Political
struggles are thus de-politicized through their mediation by law.
Mandel and the CLS school share the view that promises of abstract
rights are a "hoax."64 Such discourse is seen to constitute a form of
legitimation, and its growing popularity a "change in the nature of
legitimation, not in what is legitimated" (that is, ruling class
hegemony). 65
These critiques, while diverging on many important questions,
both suggest that rights claims (at least those grounded in
entrenched abstractions interpreted by a judicial elite) are
anti-democratic and de-politicizing. They argue that social justice (or
revolution) is better fought for in forums away from the courts, the
judges, and the rhetoric of individualism.
In the United States, the CLS critique has generated a
number of responses, primarily from people writing out of their

61 P. Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning" in S. Spitzer, ed., Research in Law and
Sociology, V. 3, (Greenwich:

JAI Press, 1980) at 25.

62 Mandel, Legalization of Politics,supra, note 59.
63 Glasbeek & Mandel, supra, note 59 at 87.

64 Mandel, Legalization of Politics,supra, note 59 at 308.
65 Glasbeek & Mandel, supra note 59 at 103.
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experience in the anti-racist and women's movements.6 6 This work
emphasizes the symbolic value of rights and attacks the rights-critics'
minimization of concrete gains made through rights struggles.
Indeed, these writers question the ability of primarily white, male
67
academics to understand what it means to have been denied rights.
Although this debate has taken place in the American context, the
arguments of the rights-defenders have relevance to the struggle at
issue here.
Robert Williams has criticized analyses suggesting that people
are fooled into "buying" rights discourse through the adoption of
some form of false consciousness.68 He suggests that rights-critics
are confusing dreams with illusions; for peoples of colour, rights are
strategic and instrumental, a way to "beat the system" or secure a
"tangible benefit."69 He argues that
[t]he frequent attacks by CLS on both rights and entitlement discourse represent
direct frontal assaults on the sole proven vehicle of the European-derived legal
tradition capable70 of mobilizing peoples of colour as well as their allies in the
majority society.

Williams contends that, to peoples of colour, rights are phenomena,
not concepts. Lack of rights is, thus, a lived experience.7 ' He asks,

66 See, for example, M.J. Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations" (1987) 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323; Schneider, supra, note 3; PJ. Williams,
"Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights" (1987) 22 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401 [hereinafter Alchemical Notes]; R.A. Williams, Jr., 'Taking Rights
Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Colour" (1987)
5 L. & Ineq. 103 [hereinafter Taking Rights].
67 Taking Rights, ibid. at 122-23: "It is far too easy for someone on a law professor's
salary to offer open-ended reconstructive projects which may bring immense benefits to a
future generation. Minority law professors, however, who enjoy the sinecurial comforts of an
academic life, cannot afford the luxury enjoyed by our CLS colleagues of not speaking to the
real and immediate needs of our respective peoples. The trust placed in us demands the
highest fiduciary standards."
68 ]bid at 121-22.
69 Ibid at 121, 125-26.
70 Ibid at 121. See also Matsuda, supra, note 66 at 338-39.
71 See Taking Rights, ibid at 123.
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"what else could a right be other than an abstraction for someone
who has never had their abstractions taken away or denied?"72
Elizabeth Schneider and Patricia Williams focus on the
symbolic value of rights struggles. Schneider discusses how rights
formulations make sense to women on an experiential level and how
73
such articulations reflect a feminist theory/practice dialectic.
Drawing from the work of Carol Gilligan, Schneider suggests that
the public assertion of legal rights can "provide women with a sense
of collective identity," and be a means of establishing self-hood. 74
Patricia Williams also addresses this notion of self-hood in the
context of the Black Civil Rights movement:
The Black experience of anonymity, the estrangement of being without a name, has

been one of living in the oblivion of society's inverse, beyond the dimension of any
consideration at all. Thus, the experience of rights-assertion has been one of both

solidarity and freedom, of empowerment of an internal and very personal sort; it
has been a process of finding the self.7 5

Rights claims can, thus, be both empowering and politicizing - quite
the opposite result to that suggested by the rights critics.
The relevance of this debate to lesbian and gay liberation
struggles should be apparent. On the one hand, our rights claims,
and Charter litigation in particular, can be seen as part of the trend
identified by Glasbeek and Mandel as the legalization of politics.
John D'Emilio has argued that a shift in emphasis has taken
place
76
from the rhetoric of gay liberation to that of gay rights:
[gay liberation] employed a language of political radicalism. It saw itself as one
piece of a much larger political impulse that strove for a complete reorganization
of institutions, values, and the structure of power in American life. Gay liberation
sought to achieve its aims by organizing masses of gay men and lesbians whose
political activity would occur largely outside courts and legislatures. These activists

72 Ibid at 125.
73 Schneider, supra, note 3 at 648-52.
74 Ibid. at 616-17. See C. Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
75

Alchemical Notes, supra, note 66 at 414.

76 J.D'Emilio, "Making and Unmaking Minorities: The Tensions Between Gay Politics

and History" (1986) 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 915. I would not want to make too
much of this, but I find it interesting that the Toronto gay newspaper The Body Politic, upon

its demise, was replaced by one called Rites.
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viewed accepted categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality as oppressive social
constructs.//

Certainly, in Canada, there is an ever-increasing reliance on
Charter litigation as a strategy for social change. "Charter-talk"has
come to dominate the strategic political discourse of the lesbian and
gay movement. The state is, in fact, encouraging the channeling of
energies in this direction by funding the lesbian/gay Charterchallenge
organization, Egale.78 Lesbian and gay community newspapers are
currently full of stories about the latest rights case. 79 Significant
resources are being concentrated in an effort to amend section 15
of the Charter to include "sexual orientation," perhaps to the
exclusion of other strategies. 80 The necessities of conforming to the
norms of legal argumentation may lead to the holding of unintended
and potentially reactionary positions.
Furthermore, the
professionalization of lesbian and gay movements may be taking
place as lawyers and legal academics
take over setting agendas and
81
defining terms of reference.
On the other hand, one could argue that rights struggles have
been a site of mobilization for lesbians and gays. The 1986
campaign to have a "sexual orientation" ground amended to the
Human Rights Code was the focus of wide-spread organizing and

77 bi at 915.
78 1 am not suggesting that the state is lesbian and gay positive.

I have explored

elsewhere the impact of the New Right on the regulation of sexuality. See D. Herman, Crisis,
Containment, and Coercion: AIDS, the New Right, and the Social Construction of Disease
in Canada (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1988) [unpublished].
79 See, for example, Gnutel, supra, note 28 and current issues of Xtra and Rites.
80 For example, there is no similar mass movement directed towards encouraging labour

unions to remove heterosexual bias in collective agreements, to re-structure ineffective human
rights code mechanisms, or to attack the transmission of compulsory heterosexuality in the
school system. The question of whether legal rights' struggles challenge heterosexuality at all
is discussed in text infia, at 812-13 and will be further explored in my doctoral research.

81 I also find two apparently contradictory trends interesting. On the one hand, I have
perceived a growing marginalization of sexual identities thought to do the gay rights cause no
good (i.e., butch/femme, drag queens, etc.). However, the focus on minority rights has at the
same time contributed to the resurgence of sexual libertarianism as so-called sexual minorities
(that is, sadomasochists, paedophiles, etc.) claim their rights as well.
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coalition-building8 2 This was, of course, a piece of lobbying not
litigation; however, the discourse was one of equal rights. For many
of us, the symbolic value of this victory was immense; the inclusion
of a sexual orientation
ground in the Code signified a recognition
83
existence.
our
of
Karen Andrews herself has been a source of inspiration for
many lesbians and gay men. Her example has encouraged others to
"come out" and challenge their invisibility in law and policy.8 4
Furthermore, her union's acceptance of the legal case has perhaps
signalled a new openness within the labour movement. Throughout
this process, Andrews has become a symbol in her own right. Thus,
such individual cases 8may
develop into larger campaigns waged on
5
behalf of a collective.
Perhaps we need to retreat from an either/or position. Rights,
like family, mean different things to different people. In assessing
the efficacy of rights claims, it may be helpful to distinguish between
various kinds of rights (not all are inherently abstract), their
initiating processes, and the way a social movement takes up a
particular rights struggle as a political mobilizer. We need to
appreciate the particular circumstances where rights claims are
necessary, strategic, and even empowering, and acknowledge that the
acquisition of formal rights may be a pre-condition for more
substantive or fundamental change. Yet, at the same time, we may
need a heightened awareness of the pitfalls of rights discourse,
particularly of the political implications of Charter litigation. We
could also think more critically about how to integrate legal practice
with radical theory.

82 D. Rayside, "Gay Rights and Family Values: The Passage of Bill 7 in Ontario" (1988)

26 Studies in Political Economy 109.
83 Some of the problems associated with defining sexuality (that is, in terms such as
"sexual orientation") are discussed in section IV, infra at 810ff.

84 See the examples listed in supra, note 28.
85 In the United States, Karen Thompson's struggle for access to and guardianship over
her hospitalized partner is not only an example of this phenomenon, but also of how a rights
struggle can politicize an individual. See K. Thompson & J. Andrzejewski, Wzy Can't Sharon
Kowalski Come Home? (San Francisco: Spinsters/Aunt Lute, 1988).
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IV. THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY
To summarize thus far, I have attempted to subject the
current, popular mode of lesbian and gay rights litigation to a
measure of critical scrutiny. Some of the problems associated with
such a strategy have been outlined. These problems include the
potential for a reinforcement of oppressive institutions (that is,
family, marriage) resulting from the employment of dominant
ideological discourse. I have also suggested that sexual freedom
struggles are de-politicized when one over-relies on law as a strategy
for social change. The current lesbian and gay appropriation of
familial ideology has been characterized as potentially undermining
a long-term agenda for women's liberation. The ideology of rights
claims as inherently progressive or good has been questioned. Yet,
we have also seen that the family can be a source of identity
affirmation and resistance. Many rights struggles have real practical
and symbolic significance, and law itself is an important site of
struggle. In the remaining pages, I want to raise a particular
problem concerning the relationship between feminist theory and
section 15 of the Charter. Hopefully, this will enlighten other areas
of enquiry.
"Immutability" is central to section 15 analysis. Determining
the immutability of a non-enumerated ground is the first step of the
Law Society "enumerated and analogous grounds" approach. 86 It is
the immutability of a non-enumerated ground that initially makes it
analogous to those enumerated.
In Law Society, Justice McIntyre (whose dissent was accepted
by the rest of the Supreme Court, with the exception of his section
1 application) threw out the old "similarly situated" test relied on by
McCrae J. in Karen Andrews.8 7 McIntyre J. accepted what he called
the "enumerated and analogous grounds" approach to section 15.
The test involves a consideration of (a) whether the alleged ground
of discrimination is enumerated or analogous, (b) whether there is
unequal treatment or differential impact, and (c) whether such

86 See Law Society, supranote 12.
87 Ibid. at 300-3. See section II, supra at 791-92.

Are We Family?: Lesbian Rights

1990]

811

treatment or impact is discriminatory in the sense of imposing a
burden! 8
With respect to the first branch of the test (which is the one
at issue in this paper), both McIntyre J. and Wilson J. refer to the

American concept of a "discrete and insular minority" as being the
kind of group worthy of section 15 protection. 89 The entire court
agreed that membership in such a minority was based on "personal
characteristics." 90 The strongest statement in support of immutablity
doctrine was made by LaForest J. in a concurring majority opinion:
The characteristic of citizenship is one typically not within the control of the
individual and, in this sense, is immutable. Citizenship is, at least temporarily, a
characteristic of personhood not alterable by conscious action and in some cases
not alterable except on the basis of unacceptable costs.9 1

Thus, in terms of sexuality, it is argued that sexual orientation is an
immutable, personal characteristic and deserves inclusion in the
section 15 list. Sexuality becomes an area beyond human agency.
Immutability is argued to be a characteristic of homosexuality
by many lesbian and gay litigants.92 The position advanced is that
we should not punish or tolerate discrimination against people who
have no control over a personal characteristic. Sympathetic

88 Ibid. at 314. I have elsewhere explored the possibility of analogizing sexuality with the
enumerated ground of "religion" and the non-enumerated ground of "political creed."
89 Ibid. at 315 (McIntyre J.); at 323-24 (Wilson J.).
90 McIntyre 3. stated:

"Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an

individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of
discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits or capacities will rarely be so
classed." Ibid. at 308. One might well ask whether lesbianism is a "personal characteristic"
of women or a "capacity" (or, for that matter, a "merit')? Or whether these categories are
as mutually exclusive as McIntyre J. makes them out to be? Although Wilson J. did not
dispute this pronouncement, statements in her judgment (which primarily addressed the
application of s.1 and which were concurred with by Dickson J.and L'Heureux-Dubd J.) were
somewhat more open-ended, allowing, perhaps, for some social constructionist perspective.
See ibid. at 323-25.
91 Ibid. at 330.
92 See for example, Appellant's Factum, supra, note 9 at 23-25; Re Univ. of Sask and
Sask. Human Rights Com'n (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 561 (Sask. Q.B.) at 525 (the gay applicant
argued that "a homosexual had an immutable sex characteristic over which he had no
control'); Watkins v. U.S. Army 837 F.2d 1428 (9 Cir. 1988).
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academics, writing in defence of the gay parent's right to child
custody, emphatically state that, "it is well documented that sexual
orientation is not a matter of choice."93 The immutability framework
conceives homosexuality and heterosexuality as either/or's - the
concern is with the homosexual's biological inability to conform to
the heterosexual norm. The norm itself is never questioned. Notions
of immutability are informed by an essentialist theory of sexuality
which posits that sexual orientations are accounted for by reference
to a biologically and/or psychologically rooted "core of difference."94
Opposed to this perspective is social construction theory.
Social constructionists contend that sexuality has historically consisted
of acts with meanings. The meaning of these acts varies over time
and place. They argue that the identity "homosexual" did not exist

in capitalist countries prior to the latter half of the nineteenth
century and arose out of the interaction of a number of economic
and social forces:
Where essentialism took for granted that all societies consist of people who are
either heterosexuals or homosexuals (with perhaps some bisexuals), constructionists
demonstrated that the notion of "the homosexual" is a sociohistorical product, not
universally applicable, and worthy of explanation in its own right. And where
essentialism would treat the self-attribution of a "homosexual identity" as
unproblematic - as simply the conscious recognition of a true, underlying
"orientation" - constructionism focused attention on identity as a complex
developmental outcome, the consequence of an interactive process of social labelling
and self-identification. Finally, by refusing to privilege any particular expression of
sexuality as "natural," constructionism shifted the whole framework of debate on the
question of homosexuality: instead of asking, why is there homosexuality? the
95
constructionists took variation for granted and asked, why is there homophobia?

At the root of essentialism, and hence notions of immutability, is the
belief that a pre-given proclivity to particular sexual activity
constitutes the basis of the categories heterosexual and homosexual.
R.G. Bagnall et al., "Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System:
Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties" (1984) 19 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 497. See also R. Green, "he Immutability of (Homo)sexual Orientation: Behavioural
Science Implications for a Constitutional (Legal) Analysis" (1988) 16 J. Psych. & L. 537,
concerning the American "equal protection doctrine."
94 See, for example, the work of Mary McIntosh, Jeffrey Weeks, John D'Emilio, Celia
Kitzinger, Judith Walkowitz, Gary Kinsman, etc.
95 S.Epstein, "Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity:
(1987) Vol. 17, 93-94 Socialist Rev. 9 at 17.
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This is the assumption behind the phrase "sexual orientation" and the
explanation of why this term is problematic for feminist theory.
Equating lesbian and gay existence with same-sex sexual activity is
reductionist and unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First,
lesbianism can be expressed politically as well as personally. It may
not be necessary to have intimate sexual relations with women in
order to be a lesbian (self-definition plus the rejection of
heterosexual privilege might suffice). Second, who has the power to
define what sexual activity is? Marilyn Frye has suggested that under
the criteria most heterosexuals (and gay men?) use to count the
"times" they "have sex," lesbians don't have sex at all - "No male
orgasms, no 'times'. ''96 Our concept of sexual activity is as
constructed and variable as are our understandings of family or
97
rights.
Heterosexuality is problematic.
As a set of dominant
ideologies and enforced practices, heterosexuality is central to
women's oppression. 98 Lesbianism thus becomes, not only the
personal recognition of oppositional desire, it also constitutes
political resistance to heterosexual hegemony. Political strategy must
therefore focus on creating conditions that encourage this political
99
understanding.
Immutability is a problem. While it may be true that a
heterosexual's sexual identity is not easily changed, this is not due
to an inherent sexuality, but to the context of enforced and
privileged heterosexuality that denies people choice. Notions of
immutability set the homosexual and the heterosexual in a mould
that is politically reactionary in that it denies to heterosexuals the
96 M. Frye, "Lesbian 'Sex7" (1988) 35 Sinister Wisdom 46 at 49.
97 See also the discussion of Margrit Eichler's testimony in the Karen Andrews case,

section II, supra at 791-93.
98 See, for example, A. Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" in A.

Snitow, ed., Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1983); C.A. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1983) 8 Signs 635; S. Jeffreys, Anticlimax A Feminist Perspective on the Sexual
Revolution (London: The Women's Press, 1990); A. Brittan, Masculinity and Power (Oxford:
Basil Black-well, 1989).
99 Of course, not all feminists problematize heterosexuality, there are some who defend
their "right" to enjoy it.
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agency to break out. A section 15 analysis not only leaves
heterosexual relations intact, uninvestigated, and unproblematized, it
also renders homosexual rights legitimate through liberal tolerance
rooted in an ideology of innate sexuality 100
Veysey v. Correctional Services of Canada,101 a case recently
decided in the Federal Court, is typical. Here, a gay male prisoner
applied for family visit privileges for his partner. The prison
authorities denied his claim, stating that only heterosexual couples
were included in the visitation program. Veysey asked the Federal
Court to find this policy discriminatory under section 15, arguing that
sexual orientation was an analogous ground. The trial court did so
and further found this discrimination unjustifiable under section 1.102
On the one hand, this case is interesting because Veysey deliberately
chose not to attempt to fit his relationship into a definition of
family. 103 Instead, he argued the entire policy was heterosexually
biased.
Yet, in finding so, the court relied on essentialist
effect of lesbian/gay rights claims
immutability doctrine.1 °4 This is an105
with which feminists must engage.
Analogies are problematic: they require a simplification that
inhibits an understanding of complexities and contradictions. But
legal discourse is all about categorization, finding similar facts, and
treating likes alike. The Supreme Court of Canada's analysis of
section 15 of the Charter in Law Society insists that we continue to
fit our lives into their terms of reference. This is, of course, the
nature of struggling within the confines of legal form. Law is not

100 The relationship between law, liberalism, and lesbian/gay consciousness will be further
explored in my doctoral research. See also C. Kitzinger, "Liberal Humanism as an Ideology
of Social Control: The Regulation of Lesbian Identities" in J. Shotter & K. Gergen, eds, Texts
of Identity (London: Sage Publications, 1989).
101 Veysey v. CorrectionalServices of Canada (1989), [1990] 1 F.C. 321, 29 F.T.R. 74.
102 Ibid at 331.
103 Ibid at 326.
104 Ibid at 329.
105 Veysey has subsequently been affirmed on other grounds by the Federal Court of
Appeal (31 May 1990, court file A-557-89). It appears from both this case and the Mossop
appeal, supra, note 16, that the federal government is prepared to concede that "sexual
orientation" is an analogous ground under section 15 of the Charter.
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easily put to feminist use. Particularly in the area of sexuality, it is
difficult to envision Charter/feminism compatability. The lesbian and
gay movement may find illuminating the lessons of feminist legal
struggle learned thus far.10 6 We may decide to "de-center" our
engagement with law reform 0 7 and to develop alternative political
1 08
strategies that spring from feminist theory and practice.
The intention of this paper was to address concerns that
extend well beyond those of Charter litigation. Lesbian feminists
need to develop ways of articulating our demands that reflect our
political theory. We need to think about how to recognize and
promote choice and agency, rather than undermine or ignore such
1 9
significant parts of our politic.
Finally, there is the issue of whether potentially divergent
strategies can live together. Does an explicit political challenge to
enforced heterosexuality or the privileging of particular family forms
implicitly contradict lesbian/gay marriage advocates? How can we
"proselytize" about sexual choice and agency while lesbian and gay
parents embroiled in custody battles must continue to insist that no
such things exist? How can we justify our relationships by mirroring
the heterosexual norm while our theory suggests lesbianism denies
the norm its authenticity? Can we say "we are family" and "we are
not family" at the same time?
Ultimately, these questions have to be worked on and worked
out collectively. All I have attempted to do is raise some concerns
about how we use law and about the changing ways we constitute
and present ourselves. And it is important to acknowledge that it
is the courage and commitment shown by many lesbian and gay
rights fighters that allows the kind of debate contained within these
pages to take place.

106 See, for example, Smart, supra, note 33. See, also, Fudge, supra, note 59.
107 See Smart, ibid at 163.
108 See supra, note 80.
109 I am not arguing in favour of liberal notions of choice. Our ability to make choices

and exercise agency is structurally constrained; my argument is about the need to promote
oppositional theory.

